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Abstract 
 Education policy discourse in the Australian state of Queensland positions schooling as a panacea to 
pervasive social instability and a means to achieve a new consensus.  This analysis interrogates the political 
strategies at work within the Queensland Government’s education vision document, Queensland State 
Education – 2010 (QSE-2010).  Policy discourse will be subjected to a double-reading and examined as 
strategic rhetoric (Nakayama & Krizek, 1995) which ‘distorts the overall frame of reference in a particular 
political direction’ (Olssen, 2005, p. 372).  As a result, discourses within QSE-2010 are read as politically 
strategic, rhetorical statements that speak of a destabilised socio-political centre and an increasingly 
turbulent economic future.  In so doing it is argued these statements work to incite anxiety through ‘the 
stimulation of subjectivity’ (Rose, 1990, p. 4).  Further, discussion of characteristics needed by the 
“desirable” future citizen of Queensland reflect efforts to ‘tame change through the making of the child’ 
(Popkewitz, 2004, p. 201).  In reaction to increasing diversity from both domestic and international 
migration to the traditionally conservative state of Queensland, such education policy indicates a strategic 
(re)visioning of centre and the relations of power tying ‘individuals “free to choose”’ (Rose, 1990, p. 4) to 
‘regulatory norms of participation’ (Popkewitz, 2004, p. 193) that are said to underpin the political dream 
of a ‘sovereignty of the good’ (Foucault, 1988, p. 61).  The casualties of this revision and the concomitant 
refusal to investigate the pathologies of schooling that alienate and disenfranchise (Vlachou, 2004; Graham, 
2006) are the children who do not conform to the norm of the desired future citizen and who become 
relegated to second tier (VET) schooling options (Education Queensland, 2000; 2002b). 
Introduction 
 In the traditionally conservative Australian state of Queensland, it appears that ‘the pressures 
of difference have begun to knock on the door’ (McCarthy, 2003, p. 133).  Population increase in 
the tropical north-eastern state from both domestic and international migration is causing 
increasing polemics relating to increasing house prices, dwindling natural resources, inadequacy 
of existing infrastructure, lifestyle change and the effects of multiculturalism upon 
“Queenslanders” (Graymore et al., 2002; BCC, 2005).  In 2000, the Queensland government 
released the education future vision document, Queensland State Education-2010 (QSE-2010) to 
provide, in the words of Premier Peter Beattie, ‘a broad description of the future for Education 
Queensland’ (Education Queensland, 2000, p. 3).  Indeed, the statements within this document 
are broad - sweeping even.  QSE-2010 generically describes forces for change including changes 
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to family structure, multiculturalism, economic change, information technology and the 
devolution of government (Education Queensland, 2000).  However five years post-inception, 
this author seeks to investigate how, in operating as a form of strategic rhetoric (Nakayama & 
Krizek, 1995), statements within the QSE-2010 vision might be working to recuperate and secure 
existing relations of power.   
 It can be argued that Queensland’s ‘need to enforce values which are at the same time alleged 
to be “natural” demonstrates the insecurity of a centre which could at one time take its own power 
much more for granted’ (Ferguson, 1990, p. 10).  These values privilege “proper” approaches to 
learning and the embodiment of the “desirable” school child as an autonomous chooser (Marshall, 
1997; Marshall, 2001; 2002a) who, in cultivating a disposition towards life-long learning 
(Popkewitz, 2004), will successfully ‘ride the rapids of change’ (Education Queensland, 2000, p. 
12).  In problematising this one-dimensional caricature of the child, I adopt a Foucauldian 
sensibility which holds that any ‘conception of ourselves as “free agents” is an illusion’ (Olssen, 
2005, p. 366) given that ‘education via governmentality effects the production of a new form of 
subject – one who believes they are free’ (Olssen, 2005, pp. 366-367).   Correspondingly, the lens 
through which I read QSE-2010 is informed by Olssen’s argument that: 
Such an education simply introduces a new form of social control and socialisation and new and 
more insidious forms of indoctrination where a belief in our own authorship binds us to the 
conditions of our own production and constitutes an identity which makes us governable. (Olssen, 
2005, p. 367) 
 In the quest to build the “autonomous” citizen of the future, Queensland education policy 
privileges particular schooling performances but describes these performances in such a way as to 
suggest they are representative of an innate human characteristic, thus naturalising particular 
ways of being.  Coupled with a disavowal of the impact of the social, QSE-2010 is a textual 
demonstration of not only ‘the tendency to attribute what should be described at the level of the 
system or culture, to being a characteristic of individuals’ (Olssen, 2005, p. 379) but also the 
political strategy of positing vulnerable individuals as the raison dĕtre for social and systemic ills.  
Thus this analysis seeks to question the effects of this (re)visioning and the apparent rejection of 
children who do not conform to the 2010 vision.  These are the children who become described as 
‘not suited to traditional schooling’ (Education Queensland, 2002b), and who end up referred to 
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‘alternative education programs and settings for students who have difficulty in conventional 
school and disciplinary structures’ (Education Queensland, 2000, p. 16).   
Queensland State Education – 2010: Forces for change 
The structure and character of the family is changing in ways that are unprecedented.  With new 
patterns of employment and underemployment, greater mobility and new concentrations of 
poverty, families are shifting in configuration from nuclear families.  Parents are older and 
working more.  Children have fewer siblings in smaller families and they move more often.   
The nurturing family of recent decades, based on consensus that the Australian dream 
surrounded every child, has melted away.  Teachers see the signs of family disruption in students 
– anxiety, depression, lack of discipline, aggression, inadequate literacy outcomes and a greater 
need for adult role models, particularly male role models.   
This places new pressures on schools and teachers to provide children with high levels of social 
support.  It makes it more difficult for some parents to help their children achieve in school.  It 
creates the need for parenting education, the need for a safe, accepting and disciplined 
environment in schools and for new links with communities to rebuild a new consensus.  
(Education Queensland, 2000, p. 4) 
…and Changes in Force 
 Discourse analysis consistent with a Foucauldian notion of discourse does not seek to reveal 
the true meaning by what is said or not said (Foucault, 1972).  Instead, when “doing” discourse 
analysis within a Foucaultian framework, one looks to statements not so much for what they say 
but what they do; that is, one questions what the constitutive or political effects of saying this 
instead of that might be?  It can be argued that there is just as much unsaid as said in the excerpt 
from QSE-2010 above.  At first reading, the omissions are glaring.  Why are parents older and 
working more?  Why do children have fewer siblings than they used to?  Why are there new 
patterns of unemployment and urbanisation?  The statements above from QSE-2010 are sweeping 
generalisations that conscientiously ignore the cyclical forces that have resulted in these changes; 
forces that hold in shape systemic and social problems for which the Queensland Government 
argues institutions such as schools ‘should not be held accountable’ (Education Queensland, 
2000: 11).    
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 However, as Foucault argues, ‘there is no subtext’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 134).  The analyst’s job 
‘does not consist therefore in rediscovering the unsaid whose place [the statement] occupies’ 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 134).  Instead, Foucault  maintains that ‘everything is never said’ and that the 
task is to determine, in all the possible enunciations that could be made on a particular subject, 
why it was that particular statements emerged to the exclusion of all others (Foucault, 1972, 
p.134).  One possible response to this question is genealogical.  Another is analytical.  There is 
not the scope within this paper to look to the local conditions of possibility that have allowed for 
the deployment of such discursive strategies.  Of interest here is more the function of these 
statements; not how they appeared and came to dominate but the fact that they did appear and 
what it is that they now do.   
 In the context of this paper then, discourse analysis is read as a exercise in explicating 
statements that function to place a discursive frame around a particular political position; that is, 
statements which coagulate and form rhetorical constructions that present a particular, strategic 
reading of social texts to (re)secure existing relations of power (Foucault, 1972; Nakayama & 
Krizek, 1995).  The intention is to demonstrate how such statements, in eliding other competing 
positions, come to present a particular view of the world and in doing so prepare the ground for 
the ‘practices that derive from them, in the social relations that they form, or, through those 
relations, modify’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 139).   
 Featured earlier, the opening paragraphs to QSE-2010 discussing changes to family structure 
and the ‘signs of family disruption in students’ (Education Queensland, 2000: 4) suggest a strain 
in the lines of force around the child that Rose argues operate as a relay ‘between the objectives 
of government and the minute details of conjugal, domestic and parental behaviour’ (Rose, 1990, 
p. xi).  According to the Queensland Government, this strain ‘creates the need for parenting 
education, the need for a safe, accepting and disciplined environment in schools and for new links 
with communities to rebuild a new consensus’ (emphasis added, Education Queensland, 2000, p. 
4).  Elsewhere and despite rhetoric towards ‘recognising the contribution to the Australian 
identity of many people with their own cultures and customs’, strain is conceived ‘in the face of 
growing global cultural hegemony’ (Education Queensland, 2000, p. 12), arguably resulting from 
the challenge felt when ‘marginalised groups insist on their own identity’ (Ferguson, 1990, p. 10).  
Somewhat disturbingly though, the role of schooling in the development of this new consensus is 
(Re)Visioning the Centre:  Queensland’s quest for the cosmopolitan child 
   
 
 
Please do not cite or circulate  
without permission of the author 
p. 6 
also described as the ‘best opportunity to preserve Australian culture and tradition’ (Education 
Queensland, 2000, p. 12), creating a indissoluble tension that scuttles an authentic acceptance of 
diversity. 
 Foucault  declares that the ‘second use of history is the systematic dissociation of identity’ 
(Foucault, 1984, p. 94).  Identity, he argues, is not fixed by some predetermined naturalised 
essence (Foucault, 1984).  Instead, identity should be regarded as formulated, constituted, derived 
and inherently weak.  Foucault maintains, ‘[t]his rather weak identity, which we attempt to 
support and to unify under a mask, is in itself only a parody: it is plural, countless spirits dispute 
its possession’  (Foucault, 1984, p. 94).  However, plurality (and dispute) begets anxiety.  If we 
historically (re)situate ourselves to recall the political imperatives leading to the constitution of 
the ethical pact said to underpin of the ‘sovereignty of the good’ (Foucault, 1988, p. 61), we can 
start to grasp that plurality is not entirely consistent with consensus, and that consensus is entirely 
necessary to solidify a pact.  When faced with ‘a complex system of distinct and multiple 
elements, unable to be mastered by the powers of synthesis’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 94), society turns 
to techniques of discipline and methods of subjection in order to secure that mastery; that is, 
modern society (re)turns to techniques of discipline-normalisation that Foucault (1975c) argues 
arose as a response to the threat of plague. 
Establishing Leper Colonies 
 In his College de France lectures, Michel Foucault describes a historical shift in the art of 
governing and the development of a productive form of power by juxtaposing two models of 
contagion control - the ‘exclusion of lepers and the inclusion of plague victims’ (Foucault, 1975c, 
p. 44).  The methods used to manage the epidemics of leprosy and plague were different although 
each disease presented a similar problem.  Both were deadly, highly contagious and spread 
through contact.  The model of contagion control relating to leprosy though, led to the leper’s 
exclusion where these unfortunate individuals were cast out ‘into a vague, external world beyond 
the town’s walls, beyond the limits of the community’ (Foucault, 1975b, p. 43) in an attempt to 
purify it.  However, despite the virtual disappearance of leprosy towards the end of the Middle 
Ages (Foucault, 1988), this model utilising the techniques of exclusion and banishment 
continued; albeit with a new object of concern. 
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Leprosy disappeared, the leper vanished, or almost, from memory; these structures remained. 
Often, in these same places, the formulas of exclusion would be repeated, strangely similar two or 
three centuries later.  Poor vagabonds, criminals, and “deranged minds” would take the part played 
by the leper. (Foucault, 1988, p. 7) 
Madness & Unreason 
 Among those confined there was distinction leading to the segregation and differential 
treatment of those characterised by “unreason” and those who were considered truly “mad”.  
“Unreason” was conceptually aligned with indolence and idleness, immorality and debauchery 
and banished or, as Foucault puts it, ‘concealed with so much care’ lest the unreasoned infect 
others with their ‘contagious example of transgression and immorality’ (Foucault, 1988, p. 81).  
Madness, on the other hand, was aligned with baseness, bestiality, a regression to animalism 
marked by the complete absence of those faculties of Reason which were taken to distinguish 
man from beast (Foucault, 1978; Foucault, 1988).   
 As Foucault (1975, 1977) argues however, exclusion, banishment and confinement resulted in 
a negative form of power, a power that subtracted from itself because the community suffered the 
loss of human utility or, in Marxist terms, the “surplus-value” that could be extracted from these 
individuals.  Hence, institutions of refuse and waste became workhouses where labour ‘assumed 
its ethical meaning: since sloth had become the absolute form of rebellion, the idle would be 
forced to work’ (Foucault, 1988, p. 57).  Although the great houses of confinement attempted to 
be economically independent through forced labour and industry, private enterprise protested ‘the 
effect of the too easy competition of the workhouses, [where] poverty was created in one area on 
the pretext of suppressing it in another’ (Foucault, 1988, p. 52).  Thus “unreason” as manifest in 
idleness, poverty, immorality and dependence needed a self-sustaining solution. 
Inclusion & Plague: To educate, reform, cure… 
 During the classical age, the problem of unreason culminated in an ethical project which saw 
‘interest in cure and exclusion coincide’ (Foucault, 1988, p. 10).  This seemingly antithetical 
coupling derived from the political dream of a ‘sovereignty of the good’ (Foucault, 1988, p. 61), 
and resulted in an effort towards a republic of the good that, paradoxically, was to be ‘imposed by 
force on all those suspected of belonging to evil’ (emphasis added, Foucault 1988, p. 61) through 
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the deployment of disciplinary technologies.  Foucault discusses plague control as a historical 
event intrinsic to the development of the modern disciplinary society and the strategic control of 
human multiplicities, not through the techniques of banishment and forced exclusion, but through 
a forced, and ever more strange inclusion (Foucault, 1975b).  Individual positioning was 
determined through the development of ‘procedures of writing and registration…[and] 
mechanisms of examination’ (Foucault, 1977, p. 191) through which were established a personal 
itinerary of particularity.  In distinguishing the exclusion of lepers from the inclusion of the leper, 
Foucault states:  
It is not exclusion but quarantine.  It is not a question of driving out individuals but rather of 
establishing and fixing them, of giving them their own place, of assigning places and of defining 
presences…  Not rejection but inclusion. (emphasis added, 1975b, p. 46) 
 The birth of the modern disciplinary society and the development of a strategic, productive 
form of power led to the displacement of overt forms of coercion and punishment, which by their 
violent nature were in danger of bringing about organised revolt and the destruction of the desired 
social order.  This new governmentality was the commencement of a shift to the regulation of self 
(Rose, 1990) made possible via the recuperative properties of psychological discourse.  
Discourse of Right versus Denial of Right 
 Ever more sophisticated methods of population control began to characterise the modern age.  
This refinement was necessitated by the apparent schism between two irreconcilable forces, the 
overt discourse of right and the covert denial of rights, where ignoble coercive disciplines work in 
opposition to the promise of freedom put forward by the formal egalitarian framework of the 
sovereignty of the good (Foucault, 1980).  However, the apparent schism arising from the conflict 
between these ‘two absolutely heterogeneous types of discourse’ (Foucault, 1980b, p. 107) - 
sovereign right versus disciplinary coercion – necessitated the unifying, collusive intervention of 
an arbitrating discourse that was successful via its claim to scientific objectivity.  The need to 
reconcile the dissonance arising between the discourse of right and systematic denial of rights is 
what Foucault maintains, ‘rendered the discourse of the human sciences possible’, for 
psychological discourse acts as a coherent relay between these ‘mechanisms of discipline and the 
principle of right’ (Foucault, 1980b, p. 107).   
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 As Foucault points out though, the discourse of discipline is incongruent with ‘that of law, 
rule, or sovereign will’ (Foucault, 1988, p. 106).  Instead of enabling access to the promise of 
freedom inherent to the discourse of right, modern disciplines silently and remotely imprison ‘by 
means of the techniques propounded by the experts of the soul’ (Rose, 1990, p. 11).  Rose 
explains the strategic role of psychological discourse thus: 
Expertise provides this essential difference between the formal apparatus of laws, courts, and 
police and the shaping of the activities of citizens.  It achieves its effects not through the threat of 
violence or constraint, but by way of the persuasion inherent in its truths, the anxieties stimulated 
by its norms, and the attraction exercised by the images of life and self it offers to us.  (Rose, 
1990, p. 10) 
 These techniques bring about the seemingly voluntary management of the self by the self 
(Rose, 1990), in order to prevent ‘the weakening of discipline and the relaxation of morals’ 
(Foucault, 1988, p. 59), thus strengthening the ethical pact underpinning the sovereignty of the 
good.  It is no accident that psychological discourse has as its object the recalcitrant, the 
disordered and the unruly.  In reconciling the irreconcilable, psychology acts to calm both 
dissonance and dissonants through the rule of the norm, as both a discursive domain and a grid of 
intelligibility for use in the interrogation and rectification of unsanctioned forms of difference.   
 The normative project culminates in the perpetual reinvestment of disciplinary power through 
techniques of normalisation engendered towards the production of the sovereign citizen, the self-
governing individual, the self-regulated learner (Popkewitz, 2001).  This modern art of governing 
can be characterised by its focus on the individual and preoccupation with governing the soul 
(Rose, 1990).  Interestingly, in the effort to (re)claim the unreasoned, psychological discourses 
that speak to self-regulation and reason disseminate universalising theories of cognition and 
development that exclude through ‘systems of recognition, divisions, and distinctions that 
construct reason and “the reasonable person”’ (Popkewitz, 2001, p. 336).  The generation of this 
power/knowledge has resulted in an impenetrable but ‘fundamentally positive power that 
fashions, observes, knows and multiplies itself on the basis of its own effects’ (Foucault, 1975b, 
p. 48) which, by virtue of its linkage to ‘a positive technique of intervention and transformation’ 
(Foucault, 1975b, p. 50), is inordinately powerful and therefore difficult to resist.   
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Knowledge & Mastery 
 The imperative towards constructing a sovereignty of the good resulted in the transformation 
of houses of banishment to moral institutions that sought to correct a ‘certain moral “abeyance”’ 
(Foucault, 1988, p. 59), and thus instead of purification through banishment or torture (Foucault, 
1977), the move to purify through curative practice was conceived.  It could be argued that the 
aim itself was virtuous and engendered towards the common good; to render unruly bodies 
productive whilst inculcating a desire to conform to the ‘great ethical pact of human existence’ 
(Foucault, 1988, p. 58).  Integral to the functioning of this “consensus” which was to underpin the 
modern disciplinary society, was what Foucault (1977) termed a ‘political technology of the 
body’ constituted by two lines of force (Deleuze, 1992); namely,  ‘a knowledge of the body that is 
not exactly the science of its functioning, and a mastery of its forces that is more than the ability 
to conquer them’ (emphasis added, Foucault, 1977, p. 26).  These lines of force, knowledge and 
mastery, truth and discipline, traverse the modern socio-political landscape through their 
embodiment within relations of power, ‘acting as go-betweens between seeing and saying’ 
(Deleuze, 1988, p. 160) to constitute a diffuse but cohesive network of power.  The interrelation 
and reciprocity of these lines of force is illustrated in Foucault’s coining of the term 
“power/knowledge”.  
 Disciplinary power functions by way of disseminating knowledge as truth, which Foucault  
claims, is ‘linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to 
effects of power which it induces and which extend it’ (Foucault, 1976, p. 133).  This “truth” is 
dispersed via discourses or enunciations of particular truth-claims and is sustained by a system of 
disciplinary technologies; seemingly insignificant practices that penetrate the social body to 
regard individuals, generating knowledge of individual particularity which then circulates to 
(re)produce and (re)inforce such claims to truth.  Knowledge and mastery - truth and discipline, 
frame the socio-political dream of this republic of the good by providing a means to secure the 
submission of forces and bodies (Foucault, 1977).  This occurs through the deployment of these 
two methods of observation and description which, through ‘their encounter’ (Deleuze, 1988, p. 
39), produce a way of knowing and ordering that can be used to neutralise the potential political 
force of human multiplicities (Foucault, 1977, p. 219).   
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Schools & Discipline 
 The imperative of good supported by the impetus of coercion led to the expansion of social 
institutions - prisons, factories, hospitals and schools - operating as sites for the exercise of 
disciplinary power.  Childhood, albeit considered predictive of adult pathology, was seen as more 
amenable to cure.  These two factors assured that ‘children were to become favoured objects and 
targets’ (Rose, 1990, p. 132) in the will to know and govern individuals.  As a result, schooling 
became a privileged disciplinary site for the individualisation and socialisation of the child as a 
desirable future sovereign citizen.  Thus, ever more sophisticated methods were developed to 
know and master the school child.  These methods, both technological and discursive, operate as 
the ‘means of visualisation and techniques of inscription’ (Rose, 1990, p. 134) and are deployed 
within social institutions, such as the schooling system, to fix and to know the individual ‘within 
a single common plane of sight’ (Rose, 1990, p. 132).  As such, schooling operates as a field of 
application for the inculcation of social and moral principles, forming a net-like organisation in 
which relations of power become exercised, (re)informed and strengthened (Foucault, 1980).   
 The intersection of these techniques of enunciation and visibility (Deleuze, 1992) construct a 
pedagogical net which acts to capture, sort, spatialise and rehabilitate individual school children 
(Graham, 2005).  The pedagogical categorisation of difference creates disciplinary spaces into 
which individuals become distributed through methods of examination that utilise ‘grids of 
specification’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 46) constituted by relative domains of knowledge; such as 
special education or educational psychology.  As Rose argues, the emergence of the individual 
within the field of knowledge came about ‘not through any abstract leap of the philosophical 
imagination, but through the mundane operation of bureaucratic documentation’ (Rose, 1990, p. 
134).  Statistical tallies of populations tabulating births, deaths, and marriages graduated to the 
complex of aptitudes, disinclinations, areas of weakness, learning styles, processing speed, short-
term memory, spatial abilities, word recognition, sociometric statuses and so on – transforming 
the work of the humble statistician into an enterprise of individualization through ‘systematic 
devices for the inscription of identity, [and] techniques that could translate the properties, 
capacities, energies of the human soul’ (Rose, 1990, p. 134).   
 In the modern schooling institution, this new-found knowledge has come to be deployed 
palliatively with ‘repression figuring only as a lateral or secondary effect’ (Foucault, 1975a, p. 
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52).  However, this obscures the other work done in the name of mass education through ignoble 
practices that occur on ‘the underside of the law’ (Foucault, 1976, p. 93f in Marshall, 2001, p.35).  
Whilst the discourse of discipline is incongruent with ‘that of law, rule, or sovereign will’ 
(Foucault, 1988, p. 106), this is disguised through the seemingly benign notion of meritocracy 
and the ‘positing of a faculty of choice’ (Marshall, 2001, p.295) which brings about notions of 
personal autonomy and the implication that we are masters of our own destiny.  Arguably, these 
notions obscure the conditions of our own production (Olssen, 2005) and how our subjectivity has 
been formed via the constitutive pressure of external forces.  One of the most influential of these 
forces is the institution and the practices of schooling.  Instead of enabling access to the promise 
of freedom inherent to the discourse of right, schooling aids to imprison the soul by taking up the 
persuasive humanism of psychological discourse to construct the school child as an autonomous 
individual who is imbued with a ‘faculty of choice’ (Marshall, 2001, p. 295).  The insertion of a 
capacity to “choose” brings with it an assertion of not only choosing to but also choosing not to.  
It is to the trap within this notion that I now turn. 
Enchained by the promise of freedom 
The psychologies that are important in contemporary social regulation do not treat the subject as 
an isolated automaton to be dominated and controlled.  On the contrary, the subject is a free 
citizen, endowed with personal desires and enmeshed in a network of dynamic relations. (Rose, 
1990, p.ix) 
 Ironically, “freedom” has become compulsory, in that the citizen is enchained by or even 
contracted to a particular illusion of freedom that is consistent with the aspirations of 
government.  Rose describes the terms of this contract by saying, ‘citizens of a liberal democracy 
are to regulate themselves; [and] government mechanisms construe them as active participants in 
their lives’, whilst so-called free citizens evaluate themselves ‘according to the criteria 
provided… by others’ (Rose, 1990, p. 10).  This is reminiscent of Foucault’s description of the 
modern art of governing when disciplinary technologies press the citizen to conform to ‘the great 
ethical pact of human existence’ (Foucault, 1988, p. 58) underpinning the ‘sovereignty of the 
good’ (Foucault, 1988, p.61).  Central to this art of governing is the production of the citizen 
‘who believes they are free’ (Olssen, 2005, p.367).  The art and/or artifice inherent to this notion 
is evident when the imposition of force on bodies becomes masked by the seductive humanism of 
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psychological discourse and ensuing technologies of the self.  This culminates in an ideal 
subject/citizen who “chooses” to uphold the terms of the social contract in the belief that, in this, 
they are exercising both the faculty and right to choose (Marshall, 1997; Marshall, 2001).   
 Political liberalist ideology, together with conceptualisations of personal autonomy, becomes 
articulated in and through the discourse of cosmopolitanism.  Popkewitz (2004) describes this as: 
…the will to empower… that inscribed a relation between the “freedom and will of the individual” 
and the “political liberty and will of the nation”.  Cosmopolitanism was a political object of social 
administration to fabricate the child and family as self-governing actors who were simultaneously 
responsible for social progress and the personal fulfilment of their own lives.  The discipline of 
cosmopolitan reason was the cornerstone of liberty but also the limit and object of government.  
(Popkewitz, 2004, p. 189) 
 The power of political liberalism (Olssen 2005) and its idealised notion of the ‘autonomous 
chooser’ (Marshall, 1997, p.42) disseminated through the discourse of cosmopolitan reason 
(Popkewitz, 2004) - is in its reasonableness.  It is hard to resist concepts such as individual rights, 
personal autonomy and rule by consensus, however, poststructural critique is not simply levelled 
at the concept but how concepts come to be taken up and used in disciplinary ways.  For example, 
Olssen objects to how the concept of autonomy ‘misrepresents and distorts the character of social 
existence… in a way that distorts the overall frame of reference in a particular political direction’ 
(emphasis added, Olssen, 2005, p.372).  The misrepresentation is in the notion that an individual 
can choose from a variety of options of their own making, in other words conceptualising ‘the 
personally autonomous individual who was free and could choose’ (Marshall, 1997, p.33).   
However, Marshall argues that the personally autonomous individual has been supplanted by ‘the 
notion of the autonomous chooser – an individual capable of choosing correctly from a variety of 
free choices’ (p. 33).  This does not mean that the autonomous chooser is free for an individual 
can only ever hope to choose from choices that are or have been made available to him/her and 
this again is within the constraints of circumstance.  Thus it is reasonable to argue that our 
freedom to choose has already been delimited by factors outside our control.     
 Existing relations of power and an individual’s position within those relations determine the 
degree to which they can exert control over their own lives.  So whilst we might be able to choose 
from the options available, we may not have the power, control or faculty to choose (or even 
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know) what we actually want.  In this regard Marshall distinguishes personal autonomy as ‘being 
able to decide for oneself’ from strategic conceptualisations of the ‘autonomous chooser’ 
supposedly imbued with a ‘a faculty of choice’ (emphasis added, Marshall, 2001, p.295).  The 
difference here is subtle and oscillates around being the author of one’s own choices as opposed 
to choosing within the limits prescribed and organised towards a particular strategic end by others 
(i.e. author versus actor, agency versus function, proactive versus reactive).  Marshall explains: 
It is not just that the insertion of the economic into the social structures the choices of the 
individual, but that, also, in behaviouristic fashion it manipulates the individual by penetrating the 
very notion of the self, structuring the individual’s choices, and thereby, in so far as one’s life is 
just the individual economic enterprise, the lives of individuals.  (Marshall, 1997, p.47, original 
emphasis) 
 Contributing to Marshall’s discussion of the problem of in/dependence for the autonomous 
chooser in delineating freedom from and freedom to (Marshall, 2001, p.294),1 I argue that the 
insertion of a faculty of choice is strategic for an additional reason - in that it allows for the 
assertion of personal responsibility; that is, to be both responsible to and responsible for.  This is 
not just the responsibility to ‘make continuous choices’ (Marshall, 2001, p.295) consistent with 
the ideal of the ‘unfinished cosmopolitan’ (Popkewitz, 2004, p.191).  If we unpack the obligations 
of cosmopolitan citizenship we find first, the responsibility to choose good choices; second, to 
take responsibility for the consequences of those choices; and third, being responsible for making 
that choice.  Thus, a second objectionable aspect of the concept of autonomy comes into play 
when the rhetoric of the autonomous individual with an ability to choose (Marshall, 1997) is used 
to construct a binary of good/bad choices and thus, good/bad choosers.   
 If one really did have the “right to choose” (Marshall, 1997), then surely there would be not be 
consequences for exercising that choice either way?  The bitter pill that the discourse of 
cosmopolitanism masks is that the common good is only good for some.  Not those who are 
capable of exercising autonomy for arguably ‘nobody is autonomous in this sense’ (Olssen, 2005, 
p. 373), but good for those who both have the capacity and are content to choose from approved 
choices in order to cultivate a civic self that can compete in ‘a race where there is no finishing 
line’ (Popkewitz, 2004, p. 207).  Undoubtedly, there are many who do not fall into this category. 
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Getting back to the future… 
 Arguably, QSE-2010 is a textual demonstration of such strategic discursive positioning.  The 
narrative deploring decay to the social fabric is an exercise in refusal that hides the 
responsibilities of government under the rhetoric of individual responsibility.  Such political 
individualism makes it incumbent upon the ‘responsibilised’ (Olssen, 2005) or desirable citizen to 
cultivate a “autonomous” cosmopolitan self so as to avoid burdening the republic of the good.  
Here again, Olssen is instructive in arguing that: 
To define the perfection of the state in terms of such a value therefore will obviously short-change 
many groups.  To make it the foundation value of the state also potentially exonerates the state 
from responsibility to assist its citizens when in need.  It is not so much of a slippage, after all, 
from arguing that “the state should assist people to become autonomous” to arguing “they expect 
all to be autonomous”.  (Olssen, 2005, p. 373, original emphasis) 
 Not only is QSE-2010 representative of the slippage to which Olssen refers but the discursive 
practices within constitute a correlative object (Foucault, 1972; Deleuze, 1988); the dissonant 
citizen at the root of civic dissonance.  This is the “unreasoned” individual who refuses to 
participate by not choosing in accordance with the “proper” choice put forward by dominant 
paradigms (Lambeir, 2005).  One could argue then that in a contemporary individualistic society 
we are free only in so long as we “choose” to adhere to the narrow parameters of the social norms 
established by and through existing relations of power.  Conversely, non-adherence is also 
perceived as a choice which brings with it a suggestion of personal responsibility, culpability and, 
most importantly, constitutes a recognizable (Butler, 1997) object of discourse (Foucault, 1972) 
upon whom the therapeutic force of the good must be directed, and if necessary, intensified 
(Foucault, 1977; Ewald, 1992).     
The object of choice 
 The concept of personal autonomy posits a faculty of choice.  This constructs notions of the 
“autonomous chooser” (Marshall, 1997, 2001), which (dis)places responsibility and allows for the 
assertion of “good/bad choices” and, by virtue “good/bad choosers”.  Such constructions of the 
individual subject are dependent upon the discourse of the human sciences, particularly the appeal 
to reason and the ability to choose reasonably.  This rhetoric permeates liberal democratic 
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discourse.  It can also be found in Queensland Government education policy, school management 
documents and media releases.  For example, in Education Views, published by Education 
Queensland, an article entitled Alternative Program helps at-risk pupils, states: 
Mr Wells said the Government’s approach to behaviour management issues was to have students 
who displayed unacceptable behaviours face up to the consequences of their actions.  (Currie, 
2000, p. 2) 
In Schools + Parents magazine, another Education Queensland publication, an article entitled 
Dealing with Misbehaviour in the Early Years, states: 
Mr O’Brien recommends parents reinforce that their child is responsible for his or her own 
behaviour (‘I can see you put your toys away yourself today!’) and appeal to their child’s own 
sense of self (‘When did you discover how to do that?) …  Mr O’Brien suggests parents seek help 
from their child’s teacher, guidance officer or principal if the behaviour persists.  (Education 
Queensland, 2005, p. 18,19) 
In a “Letter of Suspension”, the Principal addresses the letter not to the child’s parents but 
addresses the letter directly to the Grade 3 child in question,   
Dear “Randall”,2 You are suspended from “Kilternan” Primary School3 commencing on Monday 
19th March 2001 for a period of 02 school days, under Section 29 of the Education (General 
Provisions) Act 1989… (Researcher Archive No.179, Principal, 2001) 
 The use of “you” has individualising effects.  In this, it is a discursive tactic that firmly 
positions the incorrigible child as the site of the educational problem (Slee, 1994; Slee, 1995).  
This individuation also functions as a discursive dividing practice, demarcating between children 
who “choose” to conform to prevailing norms and those who do not.  Ironically, it could be 
argued that the child who “chooses” otherwise is demonstrating more autonomy than the child 
who chooses the choice already made for him.  Such is the chimera of “choice”.  
 We can see this in an example of a Behaviour Management Plan available on the Education 
Queensland website.4  The plan outlines responsibilities and consequences for primary school 
students and sets out levels of conformity, described as ‘Discipline Levels’ that move from Gold, 
Silver or Bronze, to levels of non-conformity that slide from Level 1 to Level 5.  From Level 2, 
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pejorative discourse is invoked in statements such as, “You have failed to improve your 
standards” (Education Queensland, 1995, p. 15).  At Level 5, the student is informed: 
Unfortunately, you have not shown any willingness to improve at this School.  As a result you 
have denied yourself the right to be a student at Swayneville State School.5  You will be officially 
suspended from this School.  The Director General of Education will determine your future 
primary education.  (emphasis added, Education Queensland 1995, p.15)  
 Somewhat paradoxically following this is a statement that reads: ‘A right is something which 
belongs to you and cannot be taken away by anyone.  Your classmates and teachers have the 
same right’ (Education Queensland, 1995, p.15).  The question here is: how does such an 
oxymoronic juxtaposition become possible? 
Reconciling the irreconcilable 
 Despite the promise of freedom in neo-liberalist rhetoric, leaking through behaviour 
management policy discourse is the coercive subordination of the rights of the individual to the 
demands of the moral majority.  This is evident in the use of phrases like ‘A supportive school 
environment is where school community members feel safe and valued’ (Education Queensland, 
1995, p.4, emphasis added) or ‘Our code of behaviour reflects the values of our community within 
the context of the wider democratic, multicultural society’ (p.6, emphasis added).  Here the 
responsibility of the individual is to the community and interests of the community are 
paramount.  Olssen maintains that, ‘in individualistic cultures… people are ‘responsibilized’ 
through strategies of ‘power-knowledge’ to believe they are freer than they really are’ for 
‘underpinning the determinations of individuals is a mix of shaping and conditioning forces and 
necessities’ (Olssen, 2005, p.374).  The forces and necessities to which Olssen refers are what 
Popkewitz describes as the ‘regulatory norms of participation’ (Popkewitz, 2004, p.193).  This is 
also outlined in an earlier argument by Popkewitz and Lindblad and its reiteration may be 
instructive here.  
Participation based on a universal concept of citizenship, for example represents certain norms and 
patterns of behaviour of those groups that have the authority to establish the social and cultural 
boundaries of membership.  The norms of participation can produce exclusions through 
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preferences, for example, for certain gendered or racial habits or dispositions. (Popkewitz & 
Lindblad, 2000, p. 9)  
 My analysis of policy discourse in QSE-2010 and related documents demonstrates how the 
tenets of psychological discourse within cosmopolitanism acts to rearticulate the conditions of 
such exclusions by establishing a causal link within the recalcitrant, uncooperative “unreasoned” 
citizen who “chooses” to make the wrong choices.  In this, the discourse of cosmopolitan reason 
acts to reconcile the irreconcilable; masking the schism that arises between the discourse of rights 
and the coercive denial of those rights when, for example, a child is excluded from an education 
to which our justice system states they have a legal right.  The cosmopolitan discourse of choice, 
autonomy and responsibility rearticulates that problematic by positing the child as having denied 
themselves that right.  
An Illusory Interiority 
 Psychological discourses that speak to self-regulation and reason disseminate universalising 
theories of cognition and development that exclude through ‘systems of recognition, divisions, 
and distinctions that construct reason and “the reasonable person”’ (Popkewitz, 2001, p.336).  
The child who does not choose reasonably is constructed as behaving outside of those ‘regulatory 
norms of participation’ (Popkewitz, 2004, p. 193) constituting a liberal democratic consensus.  In 
this way, the arbitrating discourse of cosmopolitan reason works to construct both centre and 
margin by defining and universalising ‘tacit standards from which specific others can then be 
declared to deviate’ (Ferguson, 1990, p. 9).  At the centre is the self-regulated child who learns 
according to the dominant paradigms that speak to “proper” approaches to learning in order to 
‘calculate the “proper” dispositions and sensitivities of reason so that children would become 
“reasonable” citizens of the future’ (Popkewitz, 2004, p. 207).   
 Dispersed to the margins is the “improper” child; the child who comes to be described in 
deficit discourses – the disruptive child, the disordered child, the learning disabled child, the 
disadvantaged child, the ESL child, the aboriginal child.6  In short, those deemed eligible for 
‘equity programs that focus on the right for all students to access education that leads to learning 
outcomes consistent with their potential’ (Education Queensland, 2000, p. 17).  Whilst the 
‘exclusions appear as a quest for greater inclusion’ (Popkewitz, 2004, p. 211), this results in an 
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illusory interiority (Deleuze, 1988); an ever more strange inclusion (Foucault, 1975b) where the 
maintenance of notions relating to normal and mainstream ensures that certain children exist as 
the included Other (Graham & Slee, 2005).  This results in an uncontested, naturalised domain at 
centre, offering up particular individuals to the full force of the gaze whilst leaving others in the 
relative but contingent safety of the shade.7 
 The discordant messages within QSE-2010 demonstrate Queensland’s struggle to absorb 
alterity ‘without having its own authority called into question’ (Ferguson, 1990, p. 11).  That is, 
Queensland works to maintain its traditional centricity via the illusory interiority of discipline-
normalisation by, for example, ‘recognising the contribution to the Australian identity of many 
people with their own cultures and customs’ (Education Queensland 2000, p. 12) but only in so 
long as traditional ‘Australian culture and tradition’ (Education Queensland 2000, p. 12) is 
preserved.  In such instances, QSE-2010 indicates a strategic (re)visioning of centre against the 
pull when ‘historically marginalised groups insist on their own identity’ which Ferguson argues, 
makes the ‘deeper, structural invisibility of the so-called centre even harder to maintain’ 
(Ferguson, 1990, p. 10).  
 In conceptualising the tear in the social fabric that supposedly once fashioned the Australian 
dream, QSE-2010 refers to the ‘need for schools to promote social cohesion, harmony and sense 
of community’ (Education Queensland 2000, p. 4), emphasising that ‘schools where there are 
high proportions of students at risk will need special support’ (Education, Queensland, 2000, p. 6) 
and that ‘the Queensland Government will provide resources to support all children’ (Education 
Queensland, 2000, p. 13).  However, this promising social justice ethic is doused by later 
clarification that this is simply to ‘avoid the need for higher expenditure on remedial welfare 
later’ (Education Queensland, 2000, p. 13).  This resonates with Olssen’s point that ‘autonomy is 
a strategy for decreasing the role of the state and increasing individual responsibility for welfare’ 
(Olssen, 2005, p. 382).  He cautions that the pursuit of personal autonomy leads not to liberation 
but ‘to unfreedom’ (Marshall, 1996, p. 83 in Olssen, 2005, p. 382) for freedom (and thus 
autonomy, agency and so on) ‘does not exist as a birthright prior to engagement in the historical 
process [but] … is a political skill to be exercised’ (Olssen, 2005, p. 384).  Undoubtedly, this is a 
skill that comes more easily to some than to others. 
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Conclusion 
 By privileging autonomy and individualism through the discourse of cosmopolitanism QSE-
2010 firmly positions particular types of children as outside of centre whilst indicating from 
where the threat to the ‘new consensus’ (Education Queensland, 2000, p. 4) may come.   
Similarly, Popkewitz (2004) describes the clarion call for educational reform as,  
a warning about the threats of moral and cultural disorganization as embodied in the 
characteristics of the child who is placed outside of the values that order the composite of the all 
children, the child who does not choose, chase desire, and become a life-long learner. (original 
emphasis, Popkewitz, 2004, p. 211) 
 The effect of this discursive positioning of centre is to naturalise traditional and privileged 
contemporary cultural norms as the “proper” way of being in the schooling context.  QSE-2010 
has been used as a blue print for a suite of reforms to education in Queensland from the 
introduction of a prep year, to a new focus on middle years, and the development of alternative 
pathways in the senior years with vocational (VET) options (Education Queensland, 2002b).  
These developments are not necessarily bad but, if retaining a Foucaultian reticence, one must be 
cognisant of potential danger.  This analysis is restricted to the reconceptualisation of the senior 
years through QSE-2010 and the resultant Education Training Reforms for the Future (Education 
Queensland, 2002b), which markets the flexible VET schooling option as ‘alternative education 
programs and settings for students who have difficulty in conventional school and disciplinary 
structures’ (Education Queensland, 2000, p. 16).  The argument goes that these options are a 
sensible offering that are more relevant to those students ‘not suited to traditional schooling’ 
(Education Queensland, 2002b), however, what is not said and therefore what seems to go 
without saying, is that the problem resides within the deviant student and that there is nothing 
wrong with traditional schooling .  In addition, alternative pathways are problematic if they 
happen to lead in particular directions by offering “choices” that reinforce socioeconomic and 
gender stratification.  
 Interrogation of the strategic rhetoric (Nakayama & Krizek, 1995) within discourses that work 
to (re)secure a normative centre may make visible constructions that have become naturalised, 
privileging particular ways of living in the world.  Naturalisation effaces.  In naturalising a 
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particular mode of existence, we construct a universalised space free from interrogation 
(Nakayama & Krizek, 1995); a ghostly centre which eludes critical analysis and thus recognition 
of the power relations embodied within notions of normalcy which exert influence over other 
ways of being.  When we particularise students as ‘not suited to traditional schooling’ (Education 
Queensland, 2002b, p. 17), we work to maintain power imbalances and structural inequity by 
naturalising attributes that carry social, political and cultural currency, such as those said to 
characterise the cosmopolitan child (Popkewitz, 2004).  This works to remove the scene of 
schooling from the field of investigation into reasons for schooling failure.  In describing and 
reifying characteristics of the life-long learner as citizen of the future ‘sovereignty of the good' 
(Foucault, 1988, p. 61), Queensland education policy effectively fashions a scapegoat for social 
and systemic problems – the difficult child, the unruly body, the uncosmopolitan child – as the 
product of global instability and family disruption who has failed to adapt and take up the 
opportunity to participate in the consolidation of Queensland as the “Smart State” of Australia. 
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1 See Marshall (2001, p.294): ‘Thereby, in relation to choice it might be argued that choice presupposes 
autonomy, and therefore some notion of understanding about the ability to choose and the range of choices 
available…. Also, autonomy presupposes that the autonomous chooser is independent and has not been 
influenced, manipulated or determined to choose in certain general directions.  It can be argued that if 
genuine autonomy is implied in the notions of choice by neo-liberals that in fact there is a limited and 
imposed sense of autonomy operating in this notion of the autonomous chooser.  Nor is freedom to be 
interpreted as merely freedom from constraints, that is in a negative sense, because there is also positive 
freedom, or freedom to. 
 
2 Randall is a pseudonym to preserve the privacy and protect the identity of the suspended child. 
 
3 Kilternan State School is a pseudonym to protect the identity of the suspending primary school. 
 
4 In Australia, education remains the authority of State Governments.  This means each state has a separate 
educational system and differences in pedagogy, governance and structure can be found between each.  
Currently, one point of difference relating to the Queensland system is that the compulsory school age does 
not begin until the year the child turns 6 years of age at which point children enter Grade 1.  Queensland 
currently offers 12 years of formal schooling, whereas in other states, such as New South Wales, 13 years 
of formal schooling is offered and children enter Kindergarten around 5 years of age to commence their 
first compulsory year of schooling.  Queensland will be implementing a full-time Preparatory year in 2007 
to bring this state system more into line with other Australian states, however enrolment in Prep will not be 
compulsory.  In addition, Queensland differs in that the Primary years include Grades 1-7 and Secondary 
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school includes Grades 8-12.  New South Wales, for example, Primary includes K-6 and Secondary is from 
7-12.  The assessment/assessment practices and final examination schema are also unique to each state. 
 
5 Ironically, this statement is followed by a section on “Rights and Responsibilities”.  The Swayneville Plan 
states: ‘A “right” is something which belongs to your [sic] and cannot be taken away by anyone’.  I find 
this rhetoric incongruent with the dominant discourses in the Plan cited earlier in this paper. 
 
6 Reference to the original inhabitants of the country now known as Australia comes most often under the 
title Indigenous people or Indigenous Australians.  The term Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
attempts to acknowledge that the original inhabitants of this country are not a homogenous group but a 
diverse multiplicity. 
 
7 In referring to shade here, I do not claim that those at centre are immune to the gaze nor reside in the 
safety of darkness.  Instead, consistent with Foucault’s discussion of ‘intensification’ and ‘redoubled 
insistence’ (Foucault, 1977; Ewald, 1992), the suggestion is that there are proximal-zones of scrutiny and 
that the force of the gaze and intensity of light increases incrementally upon one’s deviance from the 
“norm”. 
 
